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Quantum Leakage Resilience of Shamir Secret Sharing — arXiv:2609.37276

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37276
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T17:27:08.280Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
499eb42497fda6bde8b3852569251a34d4a8a27e593ce37ed5b3df65916b44e4
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e4ff1ec36127

How to cite

Quantum Leakage Resilience of Shamir Secret Sharing — arXiv:2609.37276 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37276 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e4ff1ec36127 (Metraipolis archive dc_e4ff1ec36127, sha256 499eb42497fda6bde8b3852569251a34d4a8a27e593ce37ed5b3df65916b44e4)
BibTeX
@misc{dce4ff1ec36127,
  title = {Quantum Leakage Resilience of Shamir Secret Sharing — arXiv:2609.37276},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37276},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e4ff1ec36127; sha256 499eb42497fda6bde8b3852569251a34d4a8a27e593ce37ed5b3df65916b44e4},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37276. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We initiate the study of quantum leakage resilience of unmodified Shamir secret sharing over prime fields. A well-studied leakage model for Shamir's secret sharing classically is single-bit local leakage from each share. We consider its quantum analogue where, for each party, a local leakage channel takes as input the party's share and outputs a leaked qubit. Without preshared entanglement, we show that the distinguishing advantage is $2^{-\Omega(n)}$ when the threshold rate $t/n=\tau$ exceeds $\tau_\star\approx0.73339$ by a fixed positive margin. More generally, we allow disjoint entangled blocks of any fixed maximum size where there is no entanglement between different blocks or with the adversary, and each block emits at most a fixed number of qubits. Security holds when the threshold rate is high enough (sufficiently close to one). We then allow a specified set of devices to share entanglement with the adversary. We show that security holds even when a linear number of devices ($\alpha n$ for small $\alpha>0$) share entanglement with each other and with the adversary for a large enough threshold rate. As a complementary negative result, we also show that even classical single-bit leakage makes Shamir scheme insecure if we allow arbitrarily large entanglement between the leakage devices. A GHZ state shared by exactly $t$ leakage devices makes even classical one-bit leakage insecure, without any entanglement with the adversary. In this attack, each participating device emits only one classical bit, and their joint parity distinguishes any chosen pair of secrets with a constant advantage. Thus, for fixed threshold rates above $\tau_\star$, the maximum number of devices that may share arbitrary entanglement with one another and with the adversary while preserving security is linear in $n$ up to constant factors, although the optimal support fraction remains open.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-30 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Quantum Physics (quant-ph) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37276 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T16:58:17.384Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-30?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).