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How Much Must a Private Mempool Hide? Exact Leakage Thresholds for Sandwich Attacks — arXiv:2609.31379

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31379
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T02:07:58.268Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
aa5ddc1ca78ab5bd14bee4fa7658890ed43d0936ec3b291dc8a1e240fda3efdf
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e4743cc2af82

How to cite

How Much Must a Private Mempool Hide? Exact Leakage Thresholds for Sandwich Attacks — arXiv:2609.31379 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31379 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e4743cc2af82 (Metraipolis archive dc_e4743cc2af82, sha256 aa5ddc1ca78ab5bd14bee4fa7658890ed43d0936ec3b291dc8a1e240fda3efdf)
BibTeX
@misc{dce4743cc2af82,
  title = {How Much Must a Private Mempool Hide? Exact Leakage Thresholds for Sandwich Attacks — arXiv:2609.31379},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31379},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e4743cc2af82; sha256 aa5ddc1ca78ab5bd14bee4fa7658890ed43d0936ec3b291dc8a1e240fda3efdf},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31379. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Private and encrypted mempools hide pending transactions to stop sandwich attacks and other forms of maximal extractable value (MEV), but what they hide is rarely everything: a transaction's pair, direction, and a coarse range for its size can still leak. How much leakage makes sandwiching pay? We answer exactly for a fee-free constant-product automated market maker, the pricing rule behind Uniswap v2. Traders observe an interval containing the victim's size and bid in a first-price auction for the right to sandwich it, and the winning front-run must keep the victim's trade executable at every size in the interval. The answer turns on the smallest size consistent with the leak. It alone determines the feasible front-runs, the largest feasible front-run is optimal for pointwise, expected, and worst-case profit alike, and the guaranteed profit has a closed form. When execution is costly, a privacy layer that wants to rule out sandwiches profitable at every consistent size may therefore reveal anything about the size except a lower bound above an explicit threshold; the upper end of the range is irrelevant. With two or more symmetric traders, every pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the auction hands the entire expected net rent to the auctioneer. If the direction is hidden too, no non-contingent first leg front-runs both possible directions, while post-trade arbitrage can survive even perfect pre-trade hiding.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-28 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Trading and Market Microstructure (q-fin.TR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31379 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T01:41:24.862Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-28?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).