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Why Good Experience Can End Joint Activity — arXiv:2611.02292

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02292
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-11-03T11:54:41.033Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: e70406f032a877d9c21bb682a64cd9776914b9990e86ad70969a00f3f074b31a
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e243fa5ed9cf

How to cite

Why Good Experience Can End Joint Activity — arXiv:2611.02292 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02292 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e243fa5ed9cf (Metraipolis archive dc_e243fa5ed9cf, sha256 e70406f032a877d9c21bb682a64cd9776914b9990e86ad70969a00f3f074b31a)

BibTeX

@misc{dce243fa5ed9cf,
  title = {Why Good Experience Can End Joint Activity — arXiv:2611.02292},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02292},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e243fa5ed9cf; sha256 e70406f032a877d9c21bb682a64cd9776914b9990e86ad70969a00f3f074b31a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02292. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Learning a partner's preferences through joint activity can make both partners worse off than receiving no feedback from the activity. We study a responder who values the partner's payoff but bears a cost when joining is attributed to personal interest. Both partners observe noisy evidence of whether the responder wanted the activity, available only after participation. Evidence of interest raises this cost, discouraging joining on unwanted days; joining only on wanted days would then be too revealing to sustain. With choices based on current payoffs, we derive a condition under which learning can end participation without ever making stopping beneficial to either partner. Feedback accuracy and preference persistence described by couples' diaries satisfy this condition at baseline payoffs. Once activity stops, no further evidence arrives and the belief that the responder generally wants the activity stays fixed, so waiting may never restore it; preference information available without participating can. A separate forward-looking model with highly persistent preferences shows why this remedy can also reduce joint welfare. When participation reveals preferences exactly, a responder may accept at a current loss to establish a lack of interest, making acceptance less revealing and so sustaining participation on wanted days. Free daily revelation outside the activity removes this incentive. At the model's baseline, it lowers the best joint value in monotone Markov equilibria with exact participation feedback, but raises it with feedback as weak as the diary's.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02292 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T11:15:07.654Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).