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MIFA: An MILP-based Framework for Improving Differential Fault Attacks — arXiv:2608.06837
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06837
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T09:52:56.999Z
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MIFA: An MILP-based Framework for Improving Differential Fault Attacks — arXiv:2608.06837 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06837 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e1f4bdbfe278 (Metraipolis archive dc_e1f4bdbfe278, sha256 a8f75f3ded59aa0a6b9d16f0defd31cae861b048e99dbc196e094e026053b32e)
BibTeX
@misc{dce1f4bdbfe278,
title = {MIFA: An MILP-based Framework for Improving Differential Fault Attacks — arXiv:2608.06837},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06837},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e1f4bdbfe278; sha256 a8f75f3ded59aa0a6b9d16f0defd31cae861b048e99dbc196e094e026053b32e},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06837. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
At ASIACRYPT 2021, Baksi et al. introduced DEFAULT, a block cipher designed to algorithmically resist Differential Fault Attack (DFA), claiming 64-bit DFA security regardless of the number of injected faults. At EUROCRYPT 2022, Nageler et al. demonstrated that DEFAULT's claimed DFA resistance can be broken by applying an information-combining technique. More recently, at ASIACRYPT 2024, Jana et al. improved DFA by searching for differential trails with a single solution. They showed that, for DEFAULT with a simple key schedule, injecting five faults at the fifth-to-last round reduces the key space to one, and for BAKSHEESH, injecting twelve faults at the third-to-last round achieves the same result. In this paper, we propose a new DFA framework that utilizes a Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) solver. This framework makes it possible to attack deeper rounds than previously achieved, reducing the number of fault injections required for key recovery. Furthermore, we present a method to determine the most efficient fault injection bit positions by systematically analyzing the input differences from all possible single bit-flip faults, thereby further reducing the required number of faults. This systematic analysis has the significant advantage of allowing us to theoretically calculate the required number of faults. Applying our framework, for DEFAULT, injecting three faults at the sixth-to-last round and two faults at the seventh- and eighth-to-last rounds reduces the key space to one. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-10 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06837 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T09:51:05.641Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-08-10?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).