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Autonomy in Check: Governor-Mediated Adaptive Security at the Edge — arXiv:2609.18338

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18338
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-15T14:31:35.687Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
7624d7c26445fda22973b163233996a3bba0c35f490cd93b9cf2d1f219c6a809
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e199ec13bb43

How to cite

Autonomy in Check: Governor-Mediated Adaptive Security at the Edge — arXiv:2609.18338 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18338 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e199ec13bb43 (Metraipolis archive dc_e199ec13bb43, sha256 7624d7c26445fda22973b163233996a3bba0c35f490cd93b9cf2d1f219c6a809)
BibTeX
@misc{dce199ec13bb43,
  title = {Autonomy in Check: Governor-Mediated Adaptive Security at the Edge — arXiv:2609.18338},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18338},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e199ec13bb43; sha256 7624d7c26445fda22973b163233996a3bba0c35f490cd93b9cf2d1f219c6a809},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18338. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Adaptive security at the network edge increasingly relies on automated planners, including rule-based controllers, learned policies, and LLM-assisted agents, that translate observations into enforcement actions. Once such a planner can influence live policy state, syntactic validity is not enough. A semantically wrong action, produced from incomplete or manipulated observations, can be faithfully executed by an enforcement substrate that cannot judge mission context. We address this problem by treating the boundary between planner output and kernel enforcement input as the primary security object. We propose a split-control architecture in which an untrusted planner emits typed security intents, a deterministic governor checks each intent against safety, resource, temporal-stability, and proportionality invariants, and only admitted actions are bound to signed receipts and compiled into pre-installed eBPF map updates. The paper formalizes this trust-boundary problem, defines three threat classes, develops the governor admission predicate, and reports an end-to-end prototype. Across rule-based and LLM-assisted planners on a Raspberry Pi 5 testbed connected to the university 5G Test Network, the governor admits, rejects, and bounds intents at microsecond cost without disrupting protected-flow regularity. The contribution is conceptual as much as empirical: adaptive security does not need to trust the author of an action. It needs a mediation boundary that decides whether the action is admissible.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-17 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18338 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T13:56:52.845Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-17?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).