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SCHERI: Provably Secure Speculation Under the Constant-Time Policy for CHERI (Extended Version) — arXiv:2609.17399

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17399
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-15T19:29:48.594Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
fd71376a7139f1184f6b4f7f5abeb457aa4ac321444c285f24021d16b7af88b6
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e04a44ff14fc

How to cite

SCHERI: Provably Secure Speculation Under the Constant-Time Policy for CHERI (Extended Version) — arXiv:2609.17399 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17399 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e04a44ff14fc (Metraipolis archive dc_e04a44ff14fc, sha256 fd71376a7139f1184f6b4f7f5abeb457aa4ac321444c285f24021d16b7af88b6)
BibTeX
@misc{dce04a44ff14fc,
  title = {SCHERI: Provably Secure Speculation Under the Constant-Time Policy for CHERI (Extended Version) — arXiv:2609.17399},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17399},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e04a44ff14fc; sha256 fd71376a7139f1184f6b4f7f5abeb457aa4ac321444c285f24021d16b7af88b6},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17399. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Capability-based architectures such as CHERI provide strong support for the architectural isolation of software components. To additionally protect against microarchitectural leakage, software can be written in a constant-time fashion. Modern processors, however, rely heavily on speculative execution, which can invalidate the constant-time guarantees and leak isolated secrets transiently. In this work, we show that providing secure speculation for CHERI is non-trivial, and that existing proposals fail to preserve the confidentiality guarantees. We develop a formal framework for reasoning jointly about capability safety, speculative execution, and information-flow security, and use it to demonstrate potential leaks. We then present SCHERI, a new processor design within this framework, and formally prove that it provides end-to-end secure speculation guarantees for the constant-time policy. Our results provide formal foundations and practical guidance for building future capability-based processors, which are resilient to Spectre attacks for constant-time programs.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-16 in cs.AR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Hardware Architecture (cs.AR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17399 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T18:35:20.273Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AR/2026-09-16?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).