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Robust & Scalable Website Fingerprinting via Minimal DRAM Traffic — arXiv:2611.09422

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09422
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-11-09T22:36:57.957Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 7823e9d44d9c95e313081b3e9063638fa4199ff8de7b719e3c97caa65804cc1a
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_df8e52fa2fbe

How to cite

Robust & Scalable Website Fingerprinting via Minimal DRAM Traffic — arXiv:2611.09422 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09422 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_df8e52fa2fbe (Metraipolis archive dc_df8e52fa2fbe, sha256 7823e9d44d9c95e313081b3e9063638fa4199ff8de7b719e3c97caa65804cc1a)

BibTeX

@misc{dcdf8e52fa2fbe,
  title = {Robust & Scalable Website Fingerprinting via Minimal DRAM Traffic — arXiv:2611.09422},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09422},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_df8e52fa2fbe; sha256 7823e9d44d9c95e313081b3e9063638fa4199ff8de7b719e3c97caa65804cc1a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09422. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Website fingerprinting attacks infer websites visited by users and threaten their privacy. These attacks are classified as on-path, which monitor network traffic, and co-located, which exploit shared system resources. Existing co-located attacks, such as sweep-counting and loop-counting, achieve over 90% accuracy but suffer significant performance degradation on many-core systems. Loop-counting accuracy drops from 93% on 8 cores to 50% on 24 cores, while sweep-counting accuracy decreases from 84% to 45% across multiple Core Complex Dies (CCDs). To address these limitations, we propose memory-chasing, a scalable website fingerprinting attack that exploits DRAM traffic interference through pointer-chasing traversals with minimal interference. By counting DRAM accesses over fixed intervals, the attack generates distinctive traces for website classification. Evaluated on the top 50 websites, memory-chasing achieves 96% accuracy on a 24-core system, 86% across multiple CCDs, 80% across multiple sockets, and 97% in an open-world setting. Extensive evaluation across hardware configurations, browsers, operating systems, isolation mechanisms, system noise, and countermeasures demonstrates its robustness and scalability.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (elenco arXiv cs.AR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Hardware Architecture (cs.AR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09422 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-09T22:31:32.024Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).