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Optimizing Credential Blast Radius Through Trust Boundaries and Delegation Under Post-Quantum Authentication Costs — arXiv:2609.04566

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04566
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T22:51:15.939Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
e8294b6b5490799894f8690bc3751745a05d1ad8611ce9b1c25bcacdc52ea88b
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_deb16f240386

How to cite

Optimizing Credential Blast Radius Through Trust Boundaries and Delegation Under Post-Quantum Authentication Costs — arXiv:2609.04566 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04566 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_deb16f240386 (Metraipolis archive dc_deb16f240386, sha256 e8294b6b5490799894f8690bc3751745a05d1ad8611ce9b1c25bcacdc52ea88b)
BibTeX
@misc{dcdeb16f240386,
  title = {Optimizing Credential Blast Radius Through Trust Boundaries and Delegation Under Post-Quantum Authentication Costs — arXiv:2609.04566},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04566},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_deb16f240386; sha256 e8294b6b5490799894f8690bc3751745a05d1ad8611ce9b1c25bcacdc52ea88b},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04566. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Partitioning interacting services into independently rooted trust domains limits issuer-compromise reach while increasing calls across trust boundaries. Post-quantum replacements for public-key authentication and key-establishment mechanisms can increase crossing latency on constrained or lossy paths. We formulate the joint selection of trust domains and credential-derivation structures under policy and latency constraints, linking separate service-interaction and credential-derivation graphs through domain assignment. Credential blast radius measures weighted service impact after compromise. A linear upper bound supports optimization, while a joint event model gives exact expected impact. We identify when risk from issuers trusted across domains can be incorporated into this linear score, avoiding separate issuer-propagation calculations for each candidate. Although the general problem is NP-hard, we identify restricted cases that can be solved efficiently and exactly. Joint optimization yields lower blast radius than choosing boundaries first in 195 of 230 exhaustive synthetic comparisons, especially under chained delegation. A trace-derived replay used measured post-quantum costs, synthetic risk inputs, a fixed derivation family, and one to six trust domains. Under independent compromise events, mean expected impact was up to 36% lower than with one domain within the latency budget. The framework turns risk assumptions and measured crossing costs into candidate trust-domain and credential-derivation designs.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-07 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04566 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T22:30:54.306Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-07?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).