Metraipolis › archive › dc_de91ae6f2a3d
ORCAGen: Orchestrating Context-Aware Malware Deception with RAG-Guided Generative AI — arXiv:2610.12415
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12415
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-09T06:20:37.140Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
32c95352a6f4cefc9b982e6e5c8bab34a32218992fe74b67bb86d5a545a90525- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_de91ae6f2a3d
How to cite
ORCAGen: Orchestrating Context-Aware Malware Deception with RAG-Guided Generative AI — arXiv:2610.12415 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12415 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_de91ae6f2a3d (Metraipolis archive dc_de91ae6f2a3d, sha256 32c95352a6f4cefc9b982e6e5c8bab34a32218992fe74b67bb86d5a545a90525)
BibTeX
@misc{dcde91ae6f2a3d,
title = {ORCAGen: Orchestrating Context-Aware Malware Deception with RAG-Guided Generative AI — arXiv:2610.12415},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12415},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_de91ae6f2a3d; sha256 32c95352a6f4cefc9b982e6e5c8bab34a32218992fe74b67bb86d5a545a90525},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12415. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Malware defenses often remove or isolate suspicious programs as quickly as possible. While effective for containment, this approach can also waste an opportunity to observe attacker behavior and deploy targeted countermeasures. ORCAGen takes a different approach: it uses GenAI to build malware-specific deception playbooks offline, validates them before deployment, and enforces only the verified logic at runtime. ORCAGen combines Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) with structured prompt engineering to generate both proof-of-concept (PoC) malware and corresponding deception orchestration code. A curated knowledge base (KB) of malware procedures and active defense strategies grounds the generation process, helping the LLM produce threat-specific and executable deception logic rather than generic or hallucinated outputs. The generated PoC malware provides a safe and reproducible way to test whether a deception strategy can disrupt, redirect, or suppress targeted malware behavior before the strategy is added to the runtime playbook. We evaluate ORCAGen across GPT-4o, GPT-5.5, Gemini 3.5 Flash, Qwen3-Coder, and Claude Sonnet 4.5 using execution success, hallucination rate, refinement effort, deception effectiveness, and runtime overhead. The evaluation covers synthesized malware scenarios and 150 real-world malware samples across keyloggers, information stealers, and ransomware. Across the evaluated scenarios, GPT-5.5 required the fewest refinements and produced no observed hallucinated APIs, while Gemini 3.5 Flash achieved the lowest response time and runtime overhead. The results show that RAG-guided structured prompting can support the scalable construction of malware-specific deception playbooks that remain lightweight and deterministic during runtime enforcement. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12415 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-09T05:50:00.990Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).