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$\texttt{Flip-Team}$: Cooperative Takeover Games with Stochastic Human Override — arXiv:2608.16311
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16311
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-18T19:08:10.179Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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$\texttt{Flip-Team}$: Cooperative Takeover Games with Stochastic Human Override — arXiv:2608.16311 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16311 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_de33c670f487 (Metraipolis archive dc_de33c670f487, sha256 7139aabf8b996e07f29687838408ede8157f899f23829c10a82789b537deaadf)
BibTeX
@misc{dcde33c670f487,
title = {$textttFlip-Team$: Cooperative Takeover Games with Stochastic Human Override — arXiv:2608.16311},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16311},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_de33c670f487; sha256 7139aabf8b996e07f29687838408ede8157f899f23829c10a82789b537deaadf},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16311. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Shared autonomy requires principled mechanisms for allocating and transferring control between a human and an autonomous agent. Existing approaches often rely on blending control inputs or heuristic switching rules, which lack theoretical guarantees and fail to account for the dynamics of authority transfer. This paper develops a cooperative game-theoretic framework for authority switching in shared autonomy. We formulate the control switching problem as an identical-interest dynamic game in which authority transitions are embedded into the system dynamics, yielding optimal switching policies rather than ad hoc rules. We establish the existence and characterization of team-optimal policies in pure strategies under stochastic human override, accounting for asymmetric authority where humans retain override capability. For linear-quadratic systems, we derive closed-form recursions for the optimal switching policies and value functions, enabling efficient computation independent of the continuous state. We validate the framework on scalar and multi-dimensional linear systems, demonstrating how optimal switching adapts to varying system dynamics, cost structures, and override probabilities. The results reveal fundamental trade-offs between human adaptability and autonomous efficiency, illustrating the practical benefits of grounding shared autonomy in cooperative game theory. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-18 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Systems and Control (eess.SY); Dynamical Systems (math.DS). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16311 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-18T18:12:50.760Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).