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Compute-Bounded Security Assurance - Coverage, Verification, and Response under Resource Constraints — arXiv:2609.09229

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09229
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T07:25:01.391Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
d0bf1f695739ab1676b981bf368142677fa6d3ba7e21a6042c8e155a5cf361c7
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_de04dea95e50

How to cite

Compute-Bounded Security Assurance - Coverage, Verification, and Response under Resource Constraints — arXiv:2609.09229 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09229 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_de04dea95e50 (Metraipolis archive dc_de04dea95e50, sha256 d0bf1f695739ab1676b981bf368142677fa6d3ba7e21a6042c8e155a5cf361c7)
BibTeX
@misc{dcde04dea95e50,
  title = {Compute-Bounded Security Assurance - Coverage, Verification, and Response under Resource Constraints — arXiv:2609.09229},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09229},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_de04dea95e50; sha256 d0bf1f695739ab1676b981bf368142677fa6d3ba7e21a6042c8e155a5cf361c7},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09229. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Additional inference compute can increase the number of correctly resolved security-assurance tasks, but repeated success, unique coverage, accepted evidence, and operational protection are different quantities. We develop a resource-constrained framework that separates them. For repeated conditionally independent attempts with latent success probability $\Theta$, coverage is $C_n = 1 - E[(1-\Theta)^n]$, and its limiting value is $1 - P(\Theta = 0)$. Positive pairwise outcome correlation does not by itself imply a ceiling below one: we construct two models with the same mean success and pairwise correlation but different limiting coverage. We distinguish this result from the effective sample size used to estimate a mean, and show why finite-budget observations cannot generally identify an asymptotic support ceiling. We then connect coverage to fallible evidence checking, proper scoring of factual grounding, complete resource accounting, service capacity, and a response model that includes mitigation delay. A conceptual defensive architecture separates evidence analysis, adjudication, and operational authority. An evaluation protocol specifies held-out tasks, paired comparisons, negative cases, and uncertainty reporting. The contribution is a consistent theoretical synthesis and a set of counterexamples to invalid extrapolations, rather than an empirical scaling law. All numerical illustrations are analytic; no model-parity result, hardware benchmark, or general attacker-defender equilibrium is claimed.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-10 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09229 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T07:00:16.280Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-09-10?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).