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The Limits of Price Discrimination When the Market Is Unknown — arXiv:2610.30408
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30408
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-25T08:39:41.694Z
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The Limits of Price Discrimination When the Market Is Unknown — arXiv:2610.30408 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30408 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_dd092ce006e5 (Metraipolis archive dc_dd092ce006e5, sha256 21ea1fbd6057d3fb198d0134e385ce9641554d57eaefef777bef521bf8fe1cb0)
BibTeX
@misc{dcdd092ce006e5,
title = {The Limits of Price Discrimination When the Market Is Unknown — arXiv:2610.30408},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30408},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_dd092ce006e5; sha256 21ea1fbd6057d3fb198d0134e385ce9641554d57eaefef777bef521bf8fe1cb0},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30408. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015) characterize the consumer and producer surplus pairs that segmentation can produce when the distribution of values is known. I fix only the set of possible values and characterize the pairs that some market and some segmentation can produce. They form a convex polygon. Its outer edge is the largest efficient surplus a market can have when its uniform-price profit is capped, net of that profit, and truncated equal-revenue markets attain it. At the values no segmentation is needed; strictly between two values, reaching the frontier requires splitting a market into two extremal markets. With a continuum of values up to $\bar{v}$, consumer surplus is at most $\pi\ln(\bar{v}/\pi)$ when producer surplus (the seller's profit) is $\pi$, this bound is reached without segmentation, and no market gives consumers more than $\bar{v}/e$.
Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30408 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-25T08:33:12.794Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).