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Sluice: Global Invariant, Local Enforcement for Pooled Payment-Channel Liquidity — arXiv:2609.29975
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29975
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T04:50:35.561Z
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Sluice: Global Invariant, Local Enforcement for Pooled Payment-Channel Liquidity — arXiv:2609.29975 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29975 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_dc77134f4c46 (Metraipolis archive dc_dc77134f4c46, sha256 0f96d6280bab9f98869e363e8e886eb938330b3043574f7d01a7b87c0c4bca1e)
BibTeX
@misc{dcdc77134f4c46,
title = {Sluice: Global Invariant, Local Enforcement for Pooled Payment-Channel Liquidity — arXiv:2609.29975},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29975},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_dc77134f4c46; sha256 0f96d6280bab9f98869e363e8e886eb938330b3043574f7d01a7b87c0c4bca1e},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29975. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
A routing node on the Lightning Network holds its liquidity in separate channels, so a payment can fail at a channel whose outbound balance is exhausted while the node's other channels still hold balance. Pooling the channels into one reserve fixes this only if the node's draws across all channels stay within the reserve: a global invariant that each counterparty must enforce from its own channel, with no shared counter that off-chain draws can update. A node must therefore split the reserve into per-channel quotas in advance or coordinate every draw with every counterparty. On three Lightning snapshots the advance split forfeits $16$ to $67\%$ of the pooling gain over unpooled channels, and the loss grows with channel count. Sluice recovers $19$ to $65\%$ of that loss with a nested reservation: each channel keeps an exclusive base that its counterparty checks alone, and the rest is a shared overflow drawn on with certificates from a capacity-weighted quorum of the node's counterparties. Two conflicting certificates share an honest signer, so over-drawing is prevented without a slashable stake, under a stated bound on the capacity the node controls in the signing set. Sluice loses at most $1.3$ points of payment success to coordination where deployed coin movers lose up to $10.3$, and improves them in eleven of twelve cells when stacked on them. Re-creating every base output each epoch costs $2.8$ to $5.1$ times Lightning's on-chain bytes; re-creating only those that overflowed costs $0.5$ to $1.2$ times and keeps part of the gain. Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-25 in cs.DC). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29975 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T04:28:24.149Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.DC/2026-09-25?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).