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A Systematic Approach to Mechanism Design with Stochastic Dynamic Stability — arXiv:2608.29130
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29130
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-17T09:07:10.628Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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How to cite
A Systematic Approach to Mechanism Design with Stochastic Dynamic Stability — arXiv:2608.29130 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29130 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_dbb3e582fbbf (Metraipolis archive dc_dbb3e582fbbf, sha256 0a87cf3d90a593b9d20f6cf3ccb54bf53c2646facfc63551390d8b9ff807402c)
BibTeX
@misc{dcdbb3e582fbbf,
title = {A Systematic Approach to Mechanism Design with Stochastic Dynamic Stability — arXiv:2608.29130},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29130},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_dbb3e582fbbf; sha256 0a87cf3d90a593b9d20f6cf3ccb54bf53c2646facfc63551390d8b9ff807402c},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29130. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We consider a resource allocation problem with strategic agents that have private stochastic satisfaction functions and local constraints. To achieve a global optimal solution, we propose an incentive mechanism that induces a game among the agents. For the payment function of the mechanism, we construct a family of quadratic functions using the linear matrix inequality (LMI) approach that implements the social welfare maximizing outcome on the unique Nash equilibrium (NE) of the induced game while ensuring budget balance and individual rationality. Moreover, we propose a decentralized variable sample-size proximal best-response (VS-PBR) algorithm with Krasnoselskij iteration where only aggregate information is available to the agents. The algorithm is dynamically stable, as it is proven to converge in the mean-square sense to the NE of the game. The efficiency of the mechanism is then investigated on the Sioux Falls City transportation network, where electric vehicle (EV) users jointly select their destination and route. Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-01 in math.OC). Categorie arXiv: Systems and Control (eess.SY) ; Optimization and Control (math.OC). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29130 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-17T08:40:19.787Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/math.OC/2026-09-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).