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Incentive Alignment in Online Experimentation — arXiv:2610.05922
- Source
- arXiv
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05922
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-06T05:27:16.762Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
519184f93381c1350f5a558d2a8fa3bd2398be7ed13f54705315d090c26ba8eb- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
Incentive Alignment in Online Experimentation — arXiv:2610.05922 — arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05922 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_dba12422e876 (Metraipolis archive dc_dba12422e876, sha256 519184f93381c1350f5a558d2a8fa3bd2398be7ed13f54705315d090c26ba8eb)
BibTeX
@misc{dcdba12422e876,
title = {Incentive Alignment in Online Experimentation — arXiv:2610.05922},
howpublished = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05922},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_dba12422e876; sha256 519184f93381c1350f5a558d2a8fa3bd2398be7ed13f54705315d090c26ba8eb},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05922. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Evaluating the causal effect of new features is a central goal for online platforms. While recent literature addresses limited testing traffic via centralized portfolio optimization, this perspective abstracts away a critical institutional reality: experimentation is operationally decentralized. The experimenters who develop new features also dictate which hypotheses to test, and they are typically rewarded based on empirical average treatment effects that are prone to upward bias. Left unchecked, this principal-agent conflict can severely erode platform value, a structural failure that conventional centralized levers, such as significance thresholds and traffic budgets, cannot resolve. By reframing experimentation as an incentive design problem, we demonstrate that two practical mechanisms, sample splitting and shrinkage, can effectively bridge this gap. Sample splitting aligns incentives perfectly at a bounded traffic cost, while shrinkage consumes no additional traffic and guarantees that interventions with negative expected effects are strictly unprofitable to field. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.AI, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05922 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-06T05:24:06.089Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AI/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).