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Fractional Assignment with $\ell_1$ Preferences — arXiv:2609.18299

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18299
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-15T14:08:44.826Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
b33e66859dc5b7a411464856f0d36cfa4bb9a554b3eefc04480bb65129b33db0
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_dab85cd4ec15

How to cite

Fractional Assignment with $\ell_1$ Preferences — arXiv:2609.18299 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18299 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_dab85cd4ec15 (Metraipolis archive dc_dab85cd4ec15, sha256 b33e66859dc5b7a411464856f0d36cfa4bb9a554b3eefc04480bb65129b33db0)
BibTeX
@misc{dcdab85cd4ec15,
  title = {Fractional Assignment with $ell_1$ Preferences — arXiv:2609.18299},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18299},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_dab85cd4ec15; sha256 b33e66859dc5b7a411464856f0d36cfa4bb9a554b3eefc04480bb65129b33db0},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18299. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study a fractional assignment setting where $n$ objects are to be assigned to $n$ agents with unit capacity, and each agent specifies an ideal distribution over the objects. Unlike in classic random assignment, these ideal distributions are not necessarily degenerate, as agents may prefer a mixture of objects rather than any single object. We assume that agents seek to minimize the $\ell_1$ distance between their ideal distribution and the distribution they receive, which is equivalent to maximizing the overlap between the two distributions. We propose two mechanisms, one based on water filling (WF) and the other on quadratic programming (QP), and show that both mechanisms are utilitarian-optimal (and hence Pareto efficient), envy-free, strategyproof, and satisfy equal treatment of equals. Moreover, we highlight a distinct advantage of each mechanism: while the WF mechanism satisfies the stronger property of group-strategyproofness, the QP mechanism is more robust in terms of egalitarian overlap welfare.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-17 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18299 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T13:50:52.139Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-17?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).