Metraipolis › archive › dc_da73dc1f4d51

SoK: From Finding to Deployment: Systematizing the OS Kernel Bug Lifecycle — arXiv:2609.23218

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23218
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-09T07:01:00.312Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
94e2bce64c6613954481520bf0cf58c2a1a179cccfdbb9a92988497ae75da04e
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_da73dc1f4d51

How to cite

SoK: From Finding to Deployment: Systematizing the OS Kernel Bug Lifecycle — arXiv:2609.23218 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23218 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_da73dc1f4d51 (Metraipolis archive dc_da73dc1f4d51, sha256 94e2bce64c6613954481520bf0cf58c2a1a179cccfdbb9a92988497ae75da04e)
BibTeX
@misc{dcda73dc1f4d51,
  title = {SoK: From Finding to Deployment: Systematizing the OS Kernel Bug Lifecycle — arXiv:2609.23218},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23218},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_da73dc1f4d51; sha256 94e2bce64c6613954481520bf0cf58c2a1a179cccfdbb9a92988497ae75da04e},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23218. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Automated kernel bug discovery has advanced rapidly. Continuous fuzzing and static analysis systems, such as syzbot, now expose Linux kernel bugs at a scale that downstream processes struggle to absorb. Yet a crash report is only the beginning. Before a bug is eliminated, it must be triaged, understood, patched, validated, reviewed, integrated, and often backported. These later stages remain far less automated, creating a persistent gap between bug discovery and patch deployment. This SoK systematizes the Linux kernel bug lifecycle from discovery to deployment. We organize prior work and production systems into five stages: discovery, triage, patch generation, patch validation, and integration. We explain the resulting automation gradient through kernel-specific challenges such as concurrency, implicit invariants, cross-syscall state, hardware dependence, lack of fault isolation, and architecture/configuration multiplicity. We further ground the analysis in a measurement of real syzbot-fixed bugs. The data shows that the crash-to-patch gap is not merely a backlog of unfixed reports but a structural failure mode of the repair pipeline: even after being fixed, bugs often remain open for weeks, require review-driven patch revisions, or lack reproducers that current repair and validation systems assume. This exposes a mismatch between where kernel-security automation is mature and where bug closure actually breaks down. These findings expose a deeper mismatch: today's repair and validation techniques often assume reliable reproducers, localized root causes, and checkable correctness oracles, yet these are precisely the artifacts missing from many real kernel bug reports. Closing the crash-to-patch gap, therefore, requires treating such artifacts as outputs to be produced, not prerequisites to be assumed.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-22 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Operating Systems (cs.OS); Software Engineering (cs.SE).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23218 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-09T06:56:00.970Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-22?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).