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Nash Core in Multiwinner Election — arXiv:2609.00486

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00486
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T06:42:46.053Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
18a55ad7d34c92378bf5d962bf2d535af31809bb4ce963d5226381412e55d9b9
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_da22979c59e7

How to cite

Nash Core in Multiwinner Election — arXiv:2609.00486 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00486 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_da22979c59e7 (Metraipolis archive dc_da22979c59e7, sha256 18a55ad7d34c92378bf5d962bf2d535af31809bb4ce963d5226381412e55d9b9)
BibTeX
@misc{dcda22979c59e7,
  title = {Nash Core in Multiwinner Election — arXiv:2609.00486},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00486},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_da22979c59e7; sha256 18a55ad7d34c92378bf5d962bf2d535af31809bb4ce963d5226381412e55d9b9},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00486. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

In the approval-based committee selection problem, a committee is said to be in the core if no subset of voters has an incentive to deviate by selecting a \emph{blocking} committee of proportional size, such that every voter in the deviating group strictly prefers the blocking committee. We consider the setting where candidates can be selected fractionally. Under a mild regularity assumption, we show that there always exists a weighting of candidates such that the fractional committee maximizing the candidate-weighted Nash Social Welfare is in the core. We refer to such a solution as being in the \emph{Nash core}. Additionally, we show that a Nash core solution admits a payment assignment between voters and candidates, where each voter pays a candidate they approve in proportion to the weight. For the discrete setting, where each candidate is either included or excluded from the committee, we prove that every approval-based committee election with at most eight equally weighted voters has a core committee by rounding the fractional Nash core solution. Although the non-emptiness of the core in this setting remains an open question and checking core membership is coNP-hard, we extend the notion of the Nash core to the discrete case, yielding a formulation that is efficiently verifiable and offers a promising path toward establishing core existence in discrete settings. Finally, we test our approach on real voting data using a payment-guided heuristic. We empirically show that the Nash core solution can be efficiently computed through an iterative algorithm in both the fractional and discrete settings.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-02 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00486 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T06:37:13.269Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-02?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).