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Audit the Auditors: Commitment versus Professional Judgment — arXiv:2609.24020
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24020
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-10T00:54:58.718Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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Audit the Auditors: Commitment versus Professional Judgment — arXiv:2609.24020 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24020 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_da133783eb27 (Metraipolis archive dc_da133783eb27, sha256 f54296300aa70c51a441e2ba0d56731c234fdbd748818c1a46bd8cad0635f6e4)
BibTeX
@misc{dcda133783eb27,
title = {Audit the Auditors: Commitment versus Professional Judgment — arXiv:2609.24020},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24020},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_da133783eb27; sha256 f54296300aa70c51a441e2ba0d56731c234fdbd748818c1a46bd8cad0635f6e4},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24020. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
This paper provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the trade-off between the self-regulated peer review system and independent government inspection (PCAOB) in the auditing profession. We model the peer review system as a Judgment Regime, where a stakeholder utilizes professional expertise, captured as a private signal, to make ex-post decisions on verifying audit failures. In contrast, PCAOB inspection is modeled as a Commitment Regime, where the stakeholder lacks private information but can commit ex-ante to a predetermined level of verification. We find that the Judgment Regime benefits from a resource-allocation effect and a deterrence effect driven by informed verification, whereas the Commitment Regime deters audit failures through the first-mover advantage of ex-ante commitment. Our analysis demonstrates that the stakeholder prefers the peer review system if and only if the private signal is sufficiently informative. Furthermore, comparative statics reveal that higher verification costs or stronger audit incentives shift the stakeholder's preference toward PCAOB inspection. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-22 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24020 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-09T23:50:17.678Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-22?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).