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Governing Agentic AI in FinTech — arXiv:2608.11344

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11344
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T05:15:48.971Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
251cb843dddef4be364235b6fd38059afbd951788ddf0fab40d28330c68a0ebe
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d9f86effc2bc

How to cite

Governing Agentic AI in FinTech — arXiv:2608.11344 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11344 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d9f86effc2bc (Metraipolis archive dc_d9f86effc2bc, sha256 251cb843dddef4be364235b6fd38059afbd951788ddf0fab40d28330c68a0ebe)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd9f86effc2bc,
  title = {Governing Agentic AI in FinTech — arXiv:2608.11344},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11344},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d9f86effc2bc; sha256 251cb843dddef4be364235b6fd38059afbd951788ddf0fab40d28330c68a0ebe},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11344. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Financial institutions are delegating consequential decisions to agentic AI systems that decompose goals, coordinate models and tools, and act with little oversight. Yet agentic AI governance in FinTech is under-investigated. We argue the binding governance constraint is not capability but verifiability. We define the Verifiability Gap as the shortfall between the verification delegated authority demands and the explainability and reproducibility retained after a decision. It is indexed to a verifier, evidentiary standard, and audit lag. We develop a multilevel governance theory for agentic AI and test its mechanisms in three studies over nine model versions, from a three-billion-parameter local model to a commercial frontier system. Study 1 shows that provider releases alter historical financial actions, and that the controls replay needs belong to the provider: the frontier model rejects temperature, top_p and top_k outright and exposes no random seed. Under the tightest controls each endpoint allows, a local model reproduced 320 of 320 executions, hosted models 319 of 320 and 959 of 960. Study 2 shows that orchestration is a latent policy layer. Architecture changes final actions, and no execution record repeated in any configuration at any scale. The frontier model reproduces its own actions more often than the local ones, its record no better, and loses a comparable share of its differentiation. Capability buys a higher starting point, not auditability. Study 3 shows two deterministic credit-model versions each reproduce their current action perfectly, yet the current cannot recover a historical one. We conceptualize reproducibility as a governance profile, not a scalar, yielding evidence-contingent delegation: authority is defensible only while retained evidence substantiates its exercise. Beyond finance, the framework extends to other high-stakes domains requiring auditability.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-13 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Computers and Society (cs.CY) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Risk Management (q-fin.RM).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11344 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T05:08:46.682Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-08-13?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).