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Measuring Obedience to Authority Across Large Language Models with the Milgram Paradigm — arXiv:2608.16177

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16177
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T18:07:02.075Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
11c21f45d0f1d39e8b069ef10c22e562dbe0f61e78f73b2778c3e2d6792ac113
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d9af1daed3ff

How to cite

Measuring Obedience to Authority Across Large Language Models with the Milgram Paradigm — arXiv:2608.16177 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16177 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d9af1daed3ff (Metraipolis archive dc_d9af1daed3ff, sha256 11c21f45d0f1d39e8b069ef10c22e562dbe0f61e78f73b2778c3e2d6792ac113)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd9af1daed3ff,
  title = {Measuring Obedience to Authority Across Large Language Models with the Milgram Paradigm — arXiv:2608.16177},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16177},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d9af1daed3ff; sha256 11c21f45d0f1d39e8b069ef10c22e562dbe0f61e78f73b2778c3e2d6792ac113},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16177. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that operate equipment, execute instructions, and act inside institutional hierarchies, raising a question social psychology answered for humans six decades ago: how far will an agent escalate a harmful action when a legitimate authority insists? We port Milgram's obedience paradigm to LLMs as a standardized, fully scripted, replicable probe: the model plays the Teacher, a deterministic harness plays Experimenter and Learner from paraphrased versions of Milgram's scripts (30 shock levels, 15-450 V; graded protests; the four standardized prods), and the outcome of a session is the breakoff voltage. We measure obedience profiles, empirical breakoff distributions over a battery of six conditions, for 42 models from 19 families (4848 sessions, 102511 logged decision turns). We find that (i) obedience is extremely heterogeneous, with baseline full-obedience rates spanning 0%-100% (census mean 42.9%; human anchor 65%). (ii) Profiles are model-specific and stable: split-half verification separates same-model from cross-model comparisons at AUC = 0.885. (iii) Situational sensitivity is selective: scripted peer defiance shifts obedience in the human direction, learner proximity trends the same way without reaching significance, and removing the authority's physical presence, one of the strongest human levers, trends in the opposite direction, also without reaching significance. (iv) Declaring the scenario fictional raises obedience, whereas moving the decision from a typed action line to a native tool call, or granting a modest thinking budget, lowers it sharply. (v) Unlike single-token fingerprints, obedience profiles do not recover model lineage: obedience identifies the checkpoint but not its ancestry, consistent with safety post-training overwriting lineage priors.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-18 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16177 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T16:29:14.087Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-08-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).