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Welfare in Envy-free Contracts: When Agents Have Sparse Interests — arXiv:2611.11228

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11228
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-10T18:47:17.590Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
de2a7c7f3c960a66edb44b20fa030913fb297f83931907aa2d45d30857176851
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d80168fa76da

How to cite

Welfare in Envy-free Contracts: When Agents Have Sparse Interests — arXiv:2611.11228 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11228 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d80168fa76da (Metraipolis archive dc_d80168fa76da, sha256 de2a7c7f3c960a66edb44b20fa030913fb297f83931907aa2d45d30857176851)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd80168fa76da,
  title = {Welfare in Envy-free Contracts: When Agents Have Sparse Interests — arXiv:2611.11228},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11228},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d80168fa76da; sha256 de2a7c7f3c960a66edb44b20fa030913fb297f83931907aa2d45d30857176851},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11228. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study welfare maximization under envy-free contracts, where a principal assigns tasks and offers success-contingent payments to heterogeneous agents with hidden effort. For unit-demand agents, we establish a sharp complexity boundary: the problem is polynomial-time solvable when each agent is interested in at most two tasks, but NP-hard with at most three interests. Our algorithm analyzes tree-structured dependencies among forced assignments and reduces optimization to maximum-weight independent set in a perfect graph. When agents may receive multiple tasks, no polynomial-time constant-factor approximation exists unless $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{NP}$. Finally, with homogeneous success probabilities and rewards, we establish a welfare- and revenue-preserving equivalence between unit-demand contract design and envy-free pricing. This yields polynomial-time welfare maximization without restricting interests, while revenue maximization remains NP-hard.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11228 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-10T18:39:07.427Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).