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Beyond Supra-Competitive Outcomes: Collusive Behaviour in Deep Reinforcement Learning for Optimal Execution Games — arXiv:2610.00619
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00619
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-06T12:10:27.115Z
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Beyond Supra-Competitive Outcomes: Collusive Behaviour in Deep Reinforcement Learning for Optimal Execution Games — arXiv:2610.00619 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00619 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d77bd34d0412 (Metraipolis archive dc_d77bd34d0412, sha256 e22a7a678e62c3f045e8533ada0593a38f2c88c9c13c81c96da88be384b2b412)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd77bd34d0412,
title = {Beyond Supra-Competitive Outcomes: Collusive Behaviour in Deep Reinforcement Learning for Optimal Execution Games — arXiv:2610.00619},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00619},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d77bd34d0412; sha256 e22a7a678e62c3f045e8533ada0593a38f2c88c9c13c81c96da88be384b2b412},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00619. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
In this paper, we extend earlier findings of supra-competitive outcomes in optimal-execution games by identifying a learned punitive mechanism that deters deviations and provides behavioural evidence of collusion. We investigate this mechanism in a two-player, finite-horizon Almgren-Chriss liquidation game. Independent proximal policy optimisation agents with access to within-episode price and action histories achieve costs below the Nash benchmark. We identify a profitable deviation by training against the mean learned liquidation schedule, then impose its first trade on one of the original agents. The opponent responds by accelerating liquidation. This response more than offsets the deviator's gain in every run and both player roles, while leaving the punisher's average payoff materially unchanged relative to not punishing under the same deviation. The punisher imposes greater losses on the deviator while preserving its own average payoff, despite the availability of more profitable, less punitive liquidation plans. Matching deviations and subsequent additional selling rise and later decline during training, while final policies retain an effective punitive response. We formalise two checks: whether punishment outweighs the gain from deviating, and whether the change in trading behaviour is large enough to account for the loss imposed. Both checks hold for the tested deviation. Together, these findings provide behavioural and economic evidence supporting a collusive interpretation of the learned supra-competitive outcomes. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-02 in cs.AI). Categorie arXiv: Trading and Market Microstructure (q-fin.TR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00619 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-06T10:21:28.093Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-10-02?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).