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A Graph-Based Stackelberg Security Game for Trustworthy 6G Disaggregated Architecture — arXiv:2609.29500

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29500
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T04:53:22.281Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
55c2b9375fd01ed921505bc583c7d5e8bc8a05f31f3d59e8180ceb89e8e627dc
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d6bae4f39eef

How to cite

A Graph-Based Stackelberg Security Game for Trustworthy 6G Disaggregated Architecture — arXiv:2609.29500 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29500 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d6bae4f39eef (Metraipolis archive dc_d6bae4f39eef, sha256 55c2b9375fd01ed921505bc583c7d5e8bc8a05f31f3d59e8180ceb89e8e627dc)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd6bae4f39eef,
  title = {A Graph-Based Stackelberg Security Game for Trustworthy 6G Disaggregated Architecture — arXiv:2609.29500},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29500},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d6bae4f39eef; sha256 55c2b9375fd01ed921505bc583c7d5e8bc8a05f31f3d59e8180ceb89e8e627dc},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29500. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Open, cloud-native, and AI-enabled 6G architectures make network functions easier to deploy, observe, and replace, often implemented with separate software modules. However, each explicit interface can also create an entry point, trust transition, and lateral-movement route from a cybersecurity perspective. This paper formulates architectural disaggregation as a graph-based Stackelberg design game for 6G system security. A deployment graph specifies candidate 6G system seams, while an architecture-dependent directed attack graph specifies externally reachable functions and multistage paths. The defender commits to seams and allocates hardening and monitoring; an informed attacker then chooses a path and effort. Because edge traversal and evasion factors compose multiplicatively, the attacker's path response becomes a shortest-path problem after a logarithmic transformation. Convex effort costs admit a conjugate representation, and, for each fixed architecture, the defender's control problem is a convex exponential-epigraph program solvable by path generation. We derive an architecture-comparison criterion, a threshold for AI transducers within 6G systems that jointly add visibility and exposure, and comparative statics for attacker entry and bypass innovation. Experiments with stylized standards-anchored O-RAN/6G systems over RAN, RIC, core, cloud, and edge-AI functions show that neither full integration nor maximal disaggregation is generally best. Uncontrolled seams can increase risk, whereas selectively monitored and hardened seams can improve the Stackelberg objective. We find a boundary is worthwhile only when its detection and containment gains exceed its added attack opportunities and coordination cost.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-25 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Signal Processing (eess.SP).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29500 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T04:30:43.824Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-25?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).