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On the Fragility of Efficiency: Uncoupled Learning with a Deviant — arXiv:2610.06548

Source
arXiv
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06548
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-06T05:29:28.050Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
f4c80ec6537a873ebc63906052c02770746278496ee31b1e6add24d73e858902
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d6147eaccbdd

How to cite

On the Fragility of Efficiency: Uncoupled Learning with a Deviant — arXiv:2610.06548 — arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06548 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d6147eaccbdd (Metraipolis archive dc_d6147eaccbdd, sha256 f4c80ec6537a873ebc63906052c02770746278496ee31b1e6add24d73e858902)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd6147eaccbdd,
  title = {On the Fragility of Efficiency: Uncoupled Learning with a Deviant — arXiv:2610.06548},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06548},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d6147eaccbdd; sha256 f4c80ec6537a873ebc63906052c02770746278496ee31b1e6add24d73e858902},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06548. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

An important question in learning in games is whether players can learn to achieve efficient outcomes, those that maximize the sum of their utilities, without communication or coordination. Completely uncoupled learning algorithms, which use only each player's own past actions and utilities, can guarantee this in broad classes of games, but they typically require every player to follow the same algorithm. In this work, we ask whether one can design welfare-maximizing learning algorithms that are robust to a deviant player. To study this question, we take a well-studied welfare-maximizing learning algorithm as a testbed and consider what happens when every player except one follows it. First, we consider a deviant player who either (i) always plays the same action or (ii) selects their action uniformly at random. We show that such a player can significantly alter the long-run behavior of this algorithm, leading to states that are far from welfare-maximizing, and that no completely uncoupled learning algorithm is robust to such a player in every game. Next, we consider a strategic deviant player who acts in their own interest and show that this player can adopt a different learning algorithm to shift the long-run outcome in their favor. Moreover, we show that under any completely uncoupled welfare-maximizing learning algorithm, there is a game in which some player benefits from switching to a different completely uncoupled learning algorithm. These results show that completely uncoupled welfare-maximizing learning is fragile, even to a single deviant player, suggesting that robustness may require communication or coordination.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06548 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T05:25:35.321Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).