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Assessing Triple Modular Redundancy for Wide-Link, Low-Latency NoC Routers: Reliability and Physical Design Challenges — arXiv:2608.21288

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.21288
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T10:25:19.881Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
04cd18aaf808bd37fb3a4f752dd57f3c6e65c764c905f413c32f884b64f2de2a
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d3535e223bea

How to cite

Assessing Triple Modular Redundancy for Wide-Link, Low-Latency NoC Routers: Reliability and Physical Design Challenges — arXiv:2608.21288 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.21288 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d3535e223bea (Metraipolis archive dc_d3535e223bea, sha256 04cd18aaf808bd37fb3a4f752dd57f3c6e65c764c905f413c32f884b64f2de2a)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd3535e223bea,
  title = {Assessing Triple Modular Redundancy for Wide-Link, Low-Latency NoC Routers: Reliability and Physical Design Challenges — arXiv:2608.21288},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.21288},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d3535e223bea; sha256 04cd18aaf808bd37fb3a4f752dd57f3c6e65c764c905f413c32f884b64f2de2a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.21288. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Protecting the Network-on-Chip (NoC) of physical-AI tile-based accelerators deployed in harsh environments against single-event effects (SEEs) is paramount for preventing NoC failures that can lead to deadlocks and silent data corruption (SDC). Prior work on reliable NoCs has largely focused on narrow links (e.g., 32-bit), deeply pipelined routers, and single-event upsets (SEUs). However, the state of the art has evolved toward low-latency NoC routers with ultra-wide links, implemented on advanced technology nodes and operating at frequencies above 1 GHz. We evaluate the cost and reliability trade-offs of implementing Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) at three granularities (coarse, state-only, and full) for a 2-cycle-latency NoC router with 512-bit wide links. We carry out RTL-to-GDSII physical design in TSMC 7nm technology, as well as both RTL- and netlist-level SEU and SET fault injection campaigns. We evaluate the three TMR approaches in terms of reliability, cost, and physical design strategies, further extending the assessment from a standalone router to a full AI acceleration tile. Our results show that state-only and coarse-grained TMR do not provide sufficient protection against SEEs, whereas full TMR eliminates all observed failures across more than one million injected faults per experiment. Although the standalone full-TMR router incurs a 7.04x area overhead, this cost is drastically amortized once integrated into a complete AI accelerator tile with processors and local L1 memories: the same design adds only 16.8% area and 15.2% power consumption under a GEMM benchmark at the system level, with the critical path of the tile entirely unaffected. These results demonstrate that advanced technology nodes provide sufficient routing capacity to make full TMR a practical and deployable solution for protecting NoCs in Physical AI systems operating in harsh environments.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-24 in cs.AR).
Categorie arXiv: Hardware Architecture (cs.AR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.21288 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T10:18:35.196Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AR/2026-08-24?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).