Metraipolis › archive › dc_d31fd2f1f52a

Raising Rivals' Costs on Hybrid Platforms: The Complementarity of Fees and Self-Preferencing — arXiv:2608.02800

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.02800
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-31T12:33:16.335Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
dde4751b2eb8c5a9b80a6219efadba2fc3b7d1ba37346c72bcd15f2279148375
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d31fd2f1f52a

How to cite

Raising Rivals' Costs on Hybrid Platforms: The Complementarity of Fees and Self-Preferencing — arXiv:2608.02800 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.02800 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d31fd2f1f52a (Metraipolis archive dc_d31fd2f1f52a, sha256 dde4751b2eb8c5a9b80a6219efadba2fc3b7d1ba37346c72bcd15f2279148375)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd31fd2f1f52a,
  title = {Raising Rivals' Costs on Hybrid Platforms: The Complementarity of Fees and Self-Preferencing — arXiv:2608.02800},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.02800},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d31fd2f1f52a; sha256 dde4751b2eb8c5a9b80a6219efadba2fc3b7d1ba37346c72bcd15f2279148375},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.02800. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Hybrid platforms disadvantage third-party sellers through the platform fee and self-preferencing, and regulators have worried that constraining either instrument may intensify the other. We model a platform that chooses both instruments and find the opposite: single-instrument regulation is effective because the instruments are strategic complements, and regulating either instrument curbs the other. We also find that the two instruments achieve what monopolization achieves, higher prices and reduced consumer welfare, while passing every conventional antitrust test.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-05 in econ.GN).
Categorie arXiv: General Economics (econ.GN).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.02800 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T12:20:46.794Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.GN/2026-08-05?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).