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Reputation, Strategy, and Emotion Effects on Generative AI Cooperation: A Comparison Across Reasoning and Non-Reasoning Models — arXiv:2610.01222

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01222
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-06T12:04:11.407Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
17274bef5ae38a73567dac08cff5fba0bca9d7bc096c481b7360a1680868045d
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d31ebd2245f2

How to cite

Reputation, Strategy, and Emotion Effects on Generative AI Cooperation: A Comparison Across Reasoning and Non-Reasoning Models — arXiv:2610.01222 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01222 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d31ebd2245f2 (Metraipolis archive dc_d31ebd2245f2, sha256 17274bef5ae38a73567dac08cff5fba0bca9d7bc096c481b7360a1680868045d)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd31ebd2245f2,
  title = {Reputation, Strategy, and Emotion Effects on Generative AI Cooperation: A Comparison Across Reasoning and Non-Reasoning Models — arXiv:2610.01222},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01222},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d31ebd2245f2; sha256 17274bef5ae38a73567dac08cff5fba0bca9d7bc096c481b7360a1680868045d},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01222. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

As generative AI (Gen AI) systems take on increasingly autonomous roles in economically and socially consequential interactions, understanding their propensity to cooperate -- and the signals that shape this propensity -- has become essential. We examine cooperative behavior in frontier Gen AI models using the iterated prisoner's dilemma, manipulating counterpart reputation (positive, unknown, negative), strategy (extortion vs. generosity), and non-verbal emotional signaling (facial expressions conveying competitive or cooperative appraisals). In a first study with non-reasoning models (Claude 3.5, Gemini 2.0 Flash, GPT-4o), cooperation was systematically shaped by all three factors, paralleling patterns long documented in human behavioral research, though models varied substantially in how heavily each factor was weighted. A second study with reasoning models (Claude 4.6, Gemini 3, GPT-5.2) revealed a more concentrated reliance on strategy and reputation, a near-elimination of the Potemkin effect observed in non-reasoning models (evidenced by near-uniform cooperation in a diagnostic harmony game), and a more conditional role for emotion consistent with a hierarchical cue-weighting strategy rather than a simple loss of social sensitivity. Reasoning models also showed heterogeneous end-game behavior, ranging from sustained cooperation to systematic last-round defection effect, revealing model-specific exploitability profiles with direct practical relevance for deployment in negotiation and other multi-round interactions. Together, these findings characterize Gen AI models as increasingly sophisticated, though heterogeneous, social actors, and underscore the practical value of developing standardized cooperation benchmarks to inform the responsible deployment of Gen AI in interactive, socially consequential settings.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-02 in cs.AI).
Categorie arXiv: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01222 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T10:21:27.923Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-10-02?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).