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Information Design in Smooth Games — arXiv:2202.10883
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.10883
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T03:02:13.045Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
92de50dc9a399de1af6b529b66527a482736cef7b36b47fa2a8803e036af552a- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d2f341e4e6e6
How to cite
Information Design in Smooth Games — arXiv:2202.10883 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.10883 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d2f341e4e6e6 (Metraipolis archive dc_d2f341e4e6e6, sha256 92de50dc9a399de1af6b529b66527a482736cef7b36b47fa2a8803e036af552a)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd2f341e4e6e6,
title = {Information Design in Smooth Games — arXiv:2202.10883},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.10883},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d2f341e4e6e6; sha256 92de50dc9a399de1af6b529b66527a482736cef7b36b47fa2a8803e036af552a},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.10883. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in a principal-agent contracting problem. Building on this result, we characterize optimal information structures in symmetric linear-quadratic games. With common values, targeted disclosure is robustly optimal across all priors. With interdependent and normally distributed values, linear disclosure is uniquely optimal. We illustrate our findings with applications in venture capital, Bayesian polarization, and price competition. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-14 in cs.MA). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.10883 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T02:51:08.866Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.MA/2026-09-14?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).