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Characterizing the Variance Envelope: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Spectre Telemetry Across Architectures and Workloads — arXiv:2608.13920
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13920
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T02:28:08.172Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
84cffa08801700a9739d2839e4aeb68470d324f144ba92aa8372c863a61f78e0- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
Characterizing the Variance Envelope: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Spectre Telemetry Across Architectures and Workloads — arXiv:2608.13920 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13920 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d128cf530764 (Metraipolis archive dc_d128cf530764, sha256 84cffa08801700a9739d2839e4aeb68470d324f144ba92aa8372c863a61f78e0)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd128cf530764,
title = {Characterizing the Variance Envelope: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Spectre Telemetry Across Architectures and Workloads — arXiv:2608.13920},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13920},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d128cf530764; sha256 84cffa08801700a9739d2839e4aeb68470d324f144ba92aa8372c863a61f78e0},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13920. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Hardware attacks like Spectre exploit built-in processor vulnerabilities, leaving anomalous footprints in Hardware Performance Counter (HPC) metrics. While machine learning can detect these footprints in controlled settings, static models fail in the real world when confronted with background system noise, diverse attack variants, and adversarial traffic pacing. To close this gap, this paper characterizes the "variance envelope"-the full range of how attack signatures shift- across Intel, ARM, and AMD architectures. We evaluate an extensive experimental matrix encompassing three attack variants, four pacing modes, and four background-noise conditions. Our analysis proves that HPC signatures are highly fragile and easily warped by their execution environment. Furthermore, we expose a critical microarchitectural bottleneck: the persistent, hardware-level failure of Prime+Probe attacks on the AMD Jaguar. Ultimately, this comprehensive characterization demonstrates that reliable runtime detection requires architecture-aware, adaptive monitoring rather than static models. Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-17 in cs.AR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Hardware Architecture (cs.AR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13920 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T02:21:05.706Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AR/2026-08-17?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).