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Strategically Robust Game-Theoretic Multi-Agent Trajectory Optimization — arXiv:2609.35142
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35142
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T20:54:18.217Z
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Strategically Robust Game-Theoretic Multi-Agent Trajectory Optimization — arXiv:2609.35142 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35142 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d10fd20ab756 (Metraipolis archive dc_d10fd20ab756, sha256 d6faaf1e3473450c453f1092177a6d5c957eda391e117a74dda78a43c773003b)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd10fd20ab756,
title = {Strategically Robust Game-Theoretic Multi-Agent Trajectory Optimization — arXiv:2609.35142},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35142},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d10fd20ab756; sha256 d6faaf1e3473450c453f1092177a6d5c957eda391e117a74dda78a43c773003b},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35142. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Aviation authorities worldwide expect Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) traffic management to be decentralized among service providers, requiring AAM flights to autonomously plan trajectories by predicting other flights' control inputs rather than relying on centralized coordination. Game-theoretic approaches that formulate multi-agent collision avoidance as an exact dynamic potential game can efficiently find open-loop equilibria, but they assume that agents exactly follow their equilibrium trajectories---an unrealistic assumption given uncertainties in actuation, perception, and computation. We propose a strategically robust formulation where each agent protects against a fictitious adversary that, for each timestep, perturbs other agents' control inputs within a bounded budget to minimize distance at that timestep. We show that, under reasonable assumptions on agents' distance cost and robustness levels, the strategically robust game remains an exact dynamic potential game and admits a quasi-closed-form solution to the inner adversarial problem for linear dynamics, which limits computational overhead. Experiments with up to eight agents using logarithmic distance costs show that strategic robustness selects more robust trajectories in high-collision-risk configurations while leaving low-risk trajectories nearly unchanged, with only a modest increase in runtime. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-29 in cs.MA). Categorie arXiv: Systems and Control (eess.SY) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35142 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-07T20:24:41.731Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.MA/2026-09-29?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).