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Towards a Theory of Quantitative Vulnerability Analysis for Engineering Systems — arXiv:2610.02424

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.02424
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-06T11:41:35.694Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
0bd8fc9d8af49a305c424d407a66723437bc49226756c3ca0298a645729d4d87
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d03276acd0cc

How to cite

Towards a Theory of Quantitative Vulnerability Analysis for Engineering Systems — arXiv:2610.02424 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.02424 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d03276acd0cc (Metraipolis archive dc_d03276acd0cc, sha256 0bd8fc9d8af49a305c424d407a66723437bc49226756c3ca0298a645729d4d87)
BibTeX
@misc{dcd03276acd0cc,
  title = {Towards a Theory of Quantitative Vulnerability Analysis for Engineering Systems — arXiv:2610.02424},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.02424},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_d03276acd0cc; sha256 0bd8fc9d8af49a305c424d407a66723437bc49226756c3ca0298a645729d4d87},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.02424. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Since the 1980s, risk analysis for engineering systems has been defined based on a tuple of scenarios, $\mathcal{S}$, likelihoods, $L$, and consequences, $C$, where $Risk = (\mathcal{S},L,C)$. We argue that equating this triplet with risk alone is insufficient and potentially misleading. Instead, we define this tuple as a vulnerability space $\mathcal{V} = (\mathcal{S},L,C)$, which becomes risk only when one makes specific interpretations of likelihood and consequence. Here, an interpretation has mathematical meaning, and defines a map that assigns data elements about system vulnerability to a perspective. Formally, we define a vulnerability perspective as a specific choice of interpretations of likelihood and consequence data that allows vulnerability analysis measures to be defined and analyzed. We argue that risk is only one of four common perspectives on $\mathcal{V}$ and demonstrate mathematically why each perspective should remain a distinct concept. First, we show how interpretation of $C$ as a set-valued function produces reliability measures, not risk measures. Then, we show how interpretation of $L$ via possibility theory will produce adversarial and safety measures distinct from risk. This new theoretical framework clarifies the conceptual, mathematical, and practical differences between risk, reliability, adversarial, and safety perspectives---four common engineering system analyses often conflated in the literature. A consequence of our theory is that no single perspective will reveal all vulnerabilities of an engineering system, suggesting decision-making via risk analysis may incur unavoidable and underappreciated tradeoffs from other vulnerability perspectives.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-05 in eess.SY).
Categorie arXiv: Systems and Control (eess.SY) ; Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.02424 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T10:05:37.576Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/eess.SY/2026-10-05?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).