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von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in job matching problems — arXiv:2611.00708

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00708
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T11:54:38.792Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
3abea855f83d3babf08102478b5c186aa8dec7c58b1aaa6365364c5bac2057ba
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_cfafd3a1da06

How to cite

von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in job matching problems — arXiv:2611.00708 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00708 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_cfafd3a1da06 (Metraipolis archive dc_cfafd3a1da06, sha256 3abea855f83d3babf08102478b5c186aa8dec7c58b1aaa6365364c5bac2057ba)
BibTeX
@misc{dccfafd3a1da06,
  title = {von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in job matching problems — arXiv:2611.00708},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00708},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_cfafd3a1da06; sha256 3abea855f83d3babf08102478b5c186aa8dec7c58b1aaa6365364c5bac2057ba},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00708. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We show that a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set generically exists in the many-to-one job-matching model. Unlike the core, which can be empty in this model, a vNM stable set exists whenever there is a unique efficient matching: the set of all individually rational (IR) and efficient outcomes form a vNM stable set. If an economy has multiple efficient matchings, a vNM stable set may not exist. If the vNM stable sets are required to be rich in a certain sense, then such a rich vNM stable set exists if and only if the set of efficient matchings is essentially unique, and the set of all efficient and IR outcomes forms the unique rich vNM stable set.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00708 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T11:15:07.650Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).