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From Fleet to Lab: Revisiting the Security and Complexity of Industrial Rowhammer Mitigation — arXiv:2608.26072
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.26072
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-18T00:29:40.938Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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How to cite
From Fleet to Lab: Revisiting the Security and Complexity of Industrial Rowhammer Mitigation — arXiv:2608.26072 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.26072 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_cfa50218a5ee (Metraipolis archive dc_cfa50218a5ee, sha256 550da54f663caa2b5b3b9cb3797179f377b5b2a62eb5834acb01b8c89889e709)
BibTeX
@misc{dccfa50218a5ee,
title = {From Fleet to Lab: Revisiting the Security and Complexity of Industrial Rowhammer Mitigation — arXiv:2608.26072},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.26072},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_cfa50218a5ee; sha256 550da54f663caa2b5b3b9cb3797179f377b5b2a62eb5834acb01b8c89889e709},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.26072. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
This paper studies efficient and secure Rowhammer mitigation at the Memory-Controller (MC). Rowhammer mitigation faces a fundamental tradeoff between tracking storage and mitigation rate: precise trackers (such as Misra-Gries) avoid unnecessary mitigations but require large CAM structures, whereas sampling-based schemes (such as PARA) require no storage but incur frequent mitigations even when not under attack. Microsoft recently deployed Sigries, an MC-side Rowhammer defense that combines an under-provisioned Misra-Gries tracker with a row-sampling fallback, in its Azure Cobalt 200 SoC. Sigries observed that the tracker-to-sampling transition can be insecure, and claimed the reverse transition is always safe. Our analysis shows that this transition is also vulnerable, and a Round-Robin Attack across sub-banks reduces the MTTF of Sigries to about 1 second, 8 orders of magnitude below the 13 years with PARA. Sigries also suffers from CAM complexity and high storage overheads. Our proposal, FiRM (Filtered Rowhammer Mitigation), is based on the insight that, for a secure design, the tracking-mode and sampling-mode should not be configured independently but co-designed to ensure the system remains secure not only in both modes but also during transitions. FiRM incurs zero slowdown for benign workloads, since they do not exceed the filtering threshold, and also replaces the complex CAM-based tracker with simple SRAM filters. To handle stressful patterns, we propose FiRM-P (probabilistic) and FiRM-D (deterministic). FiRM-P uses varying probabilities during transitions and steady state to ensure both security and low performance overhead. FiRM-D provides guaranteed deterministic security by modulating the rate of mitigation. Both FiRM-P and FiRM-D have less storage overhead than Sigries. Our paper shows that a principled approach can avoid both the insecurity and the complexity of Sigries. Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-27 in cs.AR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Hardware Architecture (cs.AR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.26072 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-18T00:29:32.289Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AR/2026-08-27?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).