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One Strategic Woman: Sharp Ranks and a Persistent Core — arXiv:2611.06175

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06175
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-05T18:20:23.436Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
817387d7ffc0e1de5489e5cb9665d0e40878635886e4c10b76deeb78241760ae
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_cf39b802aea9

How to cite

One Strategic Woman: Sharp Ranks and a Persistent Core — arXiv:2611.06175 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06175 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_cf39b802aea9 (Metraipolis archive dc_cf39b802aea9, sha256 817387d7ffc0e1de5489e5cb9665d0e40878635886e4c10b76deeb78241760ae)
BibTeX
@misc{dccf39b802aea9,
  title = {One Strategic Woman: Sharp Ranks and a Persistent Core — arXiv:2611.06175},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06175},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_cf39b802aea9; sha256 817387d7ffc0e1de5489e5cb9665d0e40878635886e4c10b76deeb78241760ae},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06175. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

In a balanced random stable-marriage market, one fixed woman manipulates men-proposing deferred acceptance to obtain her best attainable partner. We prove that the women's expected average true partner rank is asymptotic to $(\ln n)^2$, improving the previous $O((\ln n)^4)$ bound, while the men's is asymptotic to $n/(2\ln n)$. The men's and women's average ranks, normalized by $n/\ln n$ and $\ln n$, converge jointly in distribution to $(U,U^{-1})$, where $U$ is uniform on $(0,1)$. Under optimal truthful truncation, the span of women's average ranks within the reported stable core, divided by $\ln n$, converges in distribution to $U^{-1}-1$.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06175 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-05T18:14:18.994Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).