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The syntax and semantics of goals — arXiv:2609.19448
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19448
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-10T03:19:52.044Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
b04d8e5011efd9c9f0f2dccb990f3b835ef0969340573042f875e8f425f64100- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
The syntax and semantics of goals — arXiv:2609.19448 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19448 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_cf18185162e8 (Metraipolis archive dc_cf18185162e8, sha256 b04d8e5011efd9c9f0f2dccb990f3b835ef0969340573042f875e8f425f64100)
BibTeX
@misc{dccf18185162e8,
title = {The syntax and semantics of goals — arXiv:2609.19448},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19448},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_cf18185162e8; sha256 b04d8e5011efd9c9f0f2dccb990f3b835ef0969340573042f875e8f425f64100},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19448. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
In both cognitive science and computer science, goals are conceptualized as cognitive states that flexibly combine with world knowledge to organize and specify purposeful behavior. In this way, goals are compositional representations whose content relates to rational behavior. We here draw attention to goals as representations and their content because it highlights a parallel with other areas in cognitive science - in particular, the syntax-semantics interface in linguistics and logic - while also foregrounding foundational questions about the expressivity, design, and efficiency of different goal representations. For example, goals are typically taken as fixed and imposing constraints on desirable behaviors, but we can also identify constraints on goal representations themselves, such as whether a particular goal language is sufficiently expressive to capture behaviors of interest, or whether different goal representations capture the same behavior. Here, we synthesize work that aims to characterize the properties of different goal representations and suggest these are points of a broader design space. We close by discussing how distinguishing the form and meaning of goals can elucidate the implicit assumptions we make about goals, inform the study of interactions between higher-level cognition and motivation, and isolate axes of variation for different conceptions of goals. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-18 in cs.AI). Categorie arXiv: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19448 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-10T03:04:13.600Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-09-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).