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Revisiting the Intra-Team Communication Method to Elicit Level-k Reasoning in Beauty Contests and 11-20 Games — arXiv:2608.18069

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.18069
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T14:43:32.735Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
0cd39166635e5ac35cd6814c4fa57987556bdac37ef1d2b994cc96a622f463ad
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ce941af44bb6

How to cite

Revisiting the Intra-Team Communication Method to Elicit Level-k Reasoning in Beauty Contests and 11-20 Games — arXiv:2608.18069 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.18069 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ce941af44bb6 (Metraipolis archive dc_ce941af44bb6, sha256 0cd39166635e5ac35cd6814c4fa57987556bdac37ef1d2b994cc96a622f463ad)
BibTeX
@misc{dcce941af44bb6,
  title = {Revisiting the Intra-Team Communication Method to Elicit Level-k Reasoning in Beauty Contests and 11-20 Games — arXiv:2608.18069},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.18069},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ce941af44bb6; sha256 0cd39166635e5ac35cd6814c4fa57987556bdac37ef1d2b994cc96a622f463ad},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.18069. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

How level-0 players behave and how they are perceived by higher-level players are central questions in the literature on level-k models of boundedly rational strategic reasoning. To study these twin questions, we apply the intra-team communication method developed by Burchardi and Penczynski (2014) to identify level-0 actions and beliefs in the canonical beauty contest game and in a variant of the 11-20 game of Goeree et al. (2018), in which behavior appears inconsistent with the standard level-k model. In the beauty contest game, we replicate Burchardi and Penczynski (2014)'s finding that elicited level-0 beliefs align with observed level-0 actions. In the variant of the 11-20 game, however, elicited level-0 beliefs and observed level-0 actions diverge, and both depart from the standard level-0 assumption, suggesting a complementary explanation for the behavioral pattern documented by Goeree et al. (2018).

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-19 in econ.GN).
Categorie arXiv: General Economics (econ.GN).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.18069 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T14:38:05.650Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.GN/2026-08-19?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).