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Does Client Diversity Protect the Lightning Network? Evidence from the 2026 Core Lightning Shutdown — arXiv:2610.20952

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20952
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T10:19:15.066Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
d674be0ff7426ee682879681d90e69710c41a334ff4e45daa42e568f3c59b313
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ce5650be907d

How to cite

Does Client Diversity Protect the Lightning Network? Evidence from the 2026 Core Lightning Shutdown — arXiv:2610.20952 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20952 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ce5650be907d (Metraipolis archive dc_ce5650be907d, sha256 d674be0ff7426ee682879681d90e69710c41a334ff4e45daa42e568f3c59b313)
BibTeX
@misc{dcce5650be907d,
  title = {Does Client Diversity Protect the Lightning Network? Evidence from the 2026 Core Lightning Shutdown — arXiv:2610.20952},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20952},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ce5650be907d; sha256 d674be0ff7426ee682879681d90e69710c41a334ff4e45daa42e568f3c59b313},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20952. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Client diversity is often cited as the Lightning Network's defence against a bug in any one implementation, yet LND runs 84% of public nodes and holds 84% of public channel capacity, a share that has barely moved since 2023. We test what diversity buys with a natural experiment. On 26 August 2026, amid security fixes in every implementation, Core Lightning (CLN) maintainers told operators who could not upgrade to disconnect their nodes. Using 805 daily gossip snapshots, 132,360 on-chain channel closes and a client classifier validated against self-identifying aliases and against the wallet that builds each node's funding transactions, we find that 22% of CLN nodes went dark overnight, ten times the usual rate, mostly Tor-reachable ones; a third were still dark five weeks later. The rest of the network barely noticed. Reachability among all node pairs fell by 7.8 percentage points, a loss exceeded in 4 of 94 ordinary two-day windows and half that of a Tor denial-of-service wave in July, while among CLN pairs it fell by 24.5 points, more than in any ordinary window. Calibrated failure scenarios explain the containment: the blast radius depends on whether a failure reaches the hubs, not on how many nodes run the failing software. Losing ACINQ's Eclair node alone costs the surviving network four times the reachability lost with all 619 routable CLN nodes, and minority clients' reliance on LND for connectivity is what their size implies; CLN nodes in fact peer with each other more than chance. Diversity statistics that count nodes mislead; the quantity to track is which software the hubs run.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20952 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T08:47:32.587Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).