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A Security-Oriented Lifecycle Model for Large Language Model Systems — arXiv:2608.03626
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03626
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-31T12:19:30.182Z
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A Security-Oriented Lifecycle Model for Large Language Model Systems — arXiv:2608.03626 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03626 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ca3749e4f459 (Metraipolis archive dc_ca3749e4f459, sha256 eb04b16e0da98cd15b6a34d02f68b7d5a066ba864c7cae8c6a22f422a2c0acd6)
BibTeX
@misc{dcca3749e4f459,
title = {A Security-Oriented Lifecycle Model for Large Language Model Systems — arXiv:2608.03626},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03626},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ca3749e4f459; sha256 eb04b16e0da98cd15b6a34d02f68b7d5a066ba864c7cae8c6a22f422a2c0acd6},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03626. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Large language models are being integrated into critical infrastructure and enterprise workflows at unprecedented scale,yet the lifecycle frameworks governing their development and operations were designed for operational efficiency rather than security analysis. As a result, security-relevant activities such as data provenance verification, artifact signing, agentic permission control, and decommissioning are often left implicit or assumed to receive due care. Governance frameworks, in turn, organise requirements around risk levels or management processes without clearly linking them to the lifecycle stages where they apply. This paper addresses both deficiencies. We propose a lifecycle model for LLM systems that supports security analysis by structuring it around security-relevant boundaries rather than workflow optimisation. The model comprises 32 stages across four core pipeline layers (Data, Model, Distribution, Application), supported by a 12-stage LLMOps pillar and a 9-category governance pillar. Thirteen stages are introduced here as separate units because they expose distinct security concerns that existing frameworks do not clearly distinguish. A governance mapping synthesising the NIST AI RMF, the EU AI Act, and ISO/IEC 42001 reveals a structural property of the current regulatory landscape: governance evidence concentrates at deployment-facing stages, where systems are visible to regulators, while the most consequential decisions, data selection, alignment strategy, and capability boundaries, are made at development-facing stages, where regulatory visibility is lowest. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-05 in cs.AI). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computers and Society (cs.CY). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03626 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-31T12:05:53.068Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-08-05?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).