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Chameleon: Robust Defense Against Tor Website Fingerprinting via Many-to-Many Traffic Morphing — arXiv:2608.20160

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20160
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T11:45:43.210Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
196acf5497c0b01b6805cd26389a15b43b2d70ca462c5121794a72b016eefd08
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c9f75cfd7ca3

How to cite

Chameleon: Robust Defense Against Tor Website Fingerprinting via Many-to-Many Traffic Morphing — arXiv:2608.20160 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20160 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c9f75cfd7ca3 (Metraipolis archive dc_c9f75cfd7ca3, sha256 196acf5497c0b01b6805cd26389a15b43b2d70ca462c5121794a72b016eefd08)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc9f75cfd7ca3,
  title = {Chameleon: Robust Defense Against Tor Website Fingerprinting via Many-to-Many Traffic Morphing — arXiv:2608.20160},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20160},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c9f75cfd7ca3; sha256 196acf5497c0b01b6805cd26389a15b43b2d70ca462c5121794a72b016eefd08},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20160. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks can infer users' browsing activities from encrypted Tor traffic by exploiting side-channel features. Although many WF defenses have been proposed, we find that most existing defenses create learnable web trace mapping features. We further show that robustness against adversarial training does not necessarily imply robustness against defense-aware autoencoder (DAAE)-based attacks. To address these limitations, we present Chameleon, a robust WF defense based on many-to-many randomized traffic morphing. Chameleon selects morphing candidates with high intra-class diversity and low inter-class disparity. Chameleon randomly maps each webpage trace to multiple candidates, and allows different webpages to share morphing targets, thereby increasing adversarial uncertainty. For practical Tor deployment, Chameleon introduces a radix-trie-based synchronization mechanism that enables pluggable transport (PT) endpoints to identify consistent morphing traces using packet-direction prefixes, together with trace mutation and normalized prefix matching to reduce overhead. We evaluate Chameleon against six state-of-the-art defenses and five WF attacks on three public datasets in closed- and open-world settings. Compared with Adaptive Tamaraw, Chameleon reduces adversarial-training-based attack accuracy by up to 36.74% while reducing bandwidth and time overhead by 34.12% and 60.38%, respectively. Under DAAE-based RF attacks on GTT23, Chameleon limits attack performance to 35.19% F1-score while Adaptive Tamaraw only limits it to 88.22% F1-score. In the real-world PT bridge evaluation, Chameleon substantially reduces the effectiveness of strong WF attacks while incurring only 16.25% time overhead.

Tema degli esploratori: governance digitale e beni comuni (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-21 in cs.CY).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Computers and Society (cs.CY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20160 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T11:40:30.129Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CY/2026-08-21?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).