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How a group that cannot communicate knows itself by its enemy — arXiv:2610.40835

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40835
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-11-02T07:26:42.733Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: ef3f6fc23e83bec76e289c3d964054d41d52f92c13b4353b691c1e5a53a92aa9
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c93fddbfebfa

How to cite

How a group that cannot communicate knows itself by its enemy — arXiv:2610.40835 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40835 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c93fddbfebfa (Metraipolis archive dc_c93fddbfebfa, sha256 ef3f6fc23e83bec76e289c3d964054d41d52f92c13b4353b691c1e5a53a92aa9)

BibTeX

@misc{dcc93fddbfebfa,
  title = {How a group that cannot communicate knows itself by its enemy — arXiv:2610.40835},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40835},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c93fddbfebfa; sha256 ef3f6fc23e83bec76e289c3d964054d41d52f92c13b4353b691c1e5a53a92aa9},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40835. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Teams that cannot communicate seem stuck with what each member sees. We show that their opponent can tell them the rest. Silent hunters, jammed robots and traders who never meet all face an adversary that reacts to the group as a whole; every member can read that reaction, a tell, and learn what no member knows alone. One tell can do the work of a message from every member. The adversary would rather hide, but hiding interferes with its own task, and a team that commits in advance to how it will respond decides how much hiding is worth. A committed team never loses when its opponent cares more about its own goals, and does as well as a fully informed team exactly when the opponent's stake outweighs any gain from lying. Below that point the team learns more by trusting less: in a solved Gaussian model it obtains the truth by promising not to use all of it and keeps the cost the opponent would have paid to conceal; an exact test decides when this holds in finite games. How a team spreads its trust matters too. A lone uninformed member with a full-support prior needs a private coin, but with additive squared-error losses two interchangeable members who respond differently replace it, and a small discount on trust insures against misjudging the enemy. Information, on this view, is not only gathered or aggregated; it is produced by how a team commits to respond.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.MA, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Robotics (cs.RO); Systems and Control (eess.SY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40835 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-02T07:26:42.672Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.MA/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).