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Coalitions, Stability, and Majority Jackpots: Frameworks for Unifying Majoritarian and Proportional Allocation in Multiwinner Elections — arXiv:2611.02325
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02325
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T18:28:49.802Z
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How to cite
Coalitions, Stability, and Majority Jackpots: Frameworks for Unifying Majoritarian and Proportional Allocation in Multiwinner Elections — arXiv:2611.02325 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02325 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c8efec939fb1 (Metraipolis archive dc_c8efec939fb1, sha256 f20f6b48a64cb0758d5c6a461eddacef4975cc43a2ad37179ff9bf7354f01f72)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc8efec939fb1,
title = {Coalitions, Stability, and Majority Jackpots: Frameworks for Unifying Majoritarian and Proportional Allocation in Multiwinner Elections — arXiv:2611.02325},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02325},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c8efec939fb1; sha256 f20f6b48a64cb0758d5c6a461eddacef4975cc43a2ad37179ff9bf7354f01f72},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02325. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Social choice literature on multiwinner elections tends to focus on characterizing two distinct tasks: majoritarian representation and proportional representation. However, many real world systems can be viewed as operating between these two extremes, such as majority jackpot systems used in several countries throughout history. Towards the goal of better understanding these systems from a social choice perspective, we introduce two frameworks that encompass existing desiderata for majoritarian and proportional settings: coalitions, which encompasses properties such as fixed majority and solid coalitions; and stability, which encompasses various generalizations of Condorcet's criterion for single-winner elections, such as Gehrlein stability and local stability, among others. We develop theory and tools that characterize the mathematical and computational aspects of both frameworks across a wide array of preference structures (such as the unrestricted domain over candidates and the restricted domain of party lists). Building on this foundation, we shed new light on majority jackpot electoral systems, which to date have received limited mathematical analysis in the social choice literature. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02325 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T18:11:22.754Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).