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Two-sided Market Design Meets Autobidding — arXiv:2609.40267
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.40267
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T13:16:35.124Z
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Two-sided Market Design Meets Autobidding — arXiv:2609.40267 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.40267 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c8bcf148e942 (Metraipolis archive dc_c8bcf148e942, sha256 c882503ac950b2b3f2302ea2fcc07d7cbfe3b7b1e3b567cdeadae474cc44f9c9)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc8bcf148e942,
title = {Two-sided Market Design Meets Autobidding — arXiv:2609.40267},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.40267},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c8bcf148e942; sha256 c882503ac950b2b3f2302ea2fcc07d7cbfe3b7b1e3b567cdeadae474cc44f9c9},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.40267. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Autobidding has become a dominant paradigm in online advertising by enabling advertisers to set high-level goals while algorithms handle real-time bid optimization. A prominent example is the Return-on-Spend (RoS) value maximizer, which maximizes total value subject to an aggregate value-per-spend constraint. While most work on mechanism design for autobidders focuses on one-sided markets, many real-world platforms involve strategic behavior on both sides. We initiate the study of two-sided markets with autobidders. We first establish a stark negative result: for the challenging objective of liquid gains from trade (LGFT) in the prior-free setting, broad classes of utility-truthful, budget-balanced mechanisms have unbounded Price of Anarchy (PoA) once value-maximizing agents are present, even in double-auction environments. We then give two positive results. In the prior-free repeated double-auction setting, McAfee's Trade Reduction mechanism has unbounded PoA for LGFT but achieves constant PoA for liquid welfare under RoS bidding, showing that off-the-shelf mechanisms retain meaningful welfare guarantees. With distributional information regarding the private costs and values, we design a two-sided mechanism that is incentive compatible for each agent under its corresponding objective, individually rational, ex-ante weakly budget balanced, and achieves first-best liquid welfare, equivalently optimal LGFT, whenever at least one side of the market consists of RoS value maximizers. This result applies to matching markets with general downward-closed feasibility constraints. It contrasts sharply with the Myerson--Satterthwaite impossibility theorem~\citep{MS83}, which rules out first-best efficiency with incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance even in bilateral trade when both the buyer and the seller are quasi-linear utility maximizers.
Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-01 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.40267 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T12:48:01.889Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-10-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).