Metraipolis › archive › dc_c839ffa3f648

Sparse Disapproval Guarantees a Nonempty Hare Core — arXiv:2609.04537

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04537
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T22:45:38.718Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
5f3352a595491ce4d0a8f5146736736809f0802f9a0fbf758d95ad1e49a0115b
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c839ffa3f648

How to cite

Sparse Disapproval Guarantees a Nonempty Hare Core — arXiv:2609.04537 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04537 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c839ffa3f648 (Metraipolis archive dc_c839ffa3f648, sha256 5f3352a595491ce4d0a8f5146736736809f0802f9a0fbf758d95ad1e49a0115b)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc839ffa3f648,
  title = {Sparse Disapproval Guarantees a Nonempty Hare Core — arXiv:2609.04537},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04537},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c839ffa3f648; sha256 5f3352a595491ce4d0a8f5146736736809f0802f9a0fbf758d95ad1e49a0115b},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04537. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

An approval committee is Hare-core stable if no coalition meeting the Hare quota can strictly improve by moving to another candidate set. Whether every approval election has such a committee remains open. We prove nonemptiness when each voter disapproves at most two candidates, with no bounds on the numbers of candidates, seats, or voter types. The result also permits arbitrary positive rational voter weights. Our deterministic rule represents a committee by its missing set. It first maximizes weighted coverage of two-candidate disapproval sets and then maximizes total disapproval incidence. An exact coverage inequality excludes targets one seat below the committee. The incidence objective excludes unanimous equal-size targets, while targets of size at most $k-2$ cannot improve any voter. Two implementation-level independent verifiers audit overlapping finite grids. The symbolic proof, not this bounded enumeration, establishes the theorem's unbounded quantifiers. The argument identifies complement-side coverage as a tractable mechanism for a broad parameter range within a sharply defined preference domain.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-07 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04537 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T22:29:53.695Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-07?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).