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Information Design for Behaviorally Stable Platooning — arXiv:2611.00584

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00584
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T18:28:48.324Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
bc3e9ed80b81f80a4b28e6e1da937ed1ad0a67518851c5c7c05ed87a4dd5469d
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c832ebcb55d0

How to cite

Information Design for Behaviorally Stable Platooning — arXiv:2611.00584 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00584 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c832ebcb55d0 (Metraipolis archive dc_c832ebcb55d0, sha256 bc3e9ed80b81f80a4b28e6e1da937ed1ad0a67518851c5c7c05ed87a4dd5469d)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc832ebcb55d0,
  title = {Information Design for Behaviorally Stable Platooning — arXiv:2611.00584},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00584},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c832ebcb55d0; sha256 bc3e9ed80b81f80a4b28e6e1da937ed1ad0a67518851c5c7c05ed87a4dd5469d},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00584. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Voluntary platoon formation requires vehicles to coordinate despite uncertain downstream fuel savings and private joining incentives. We study whether an informed operator can encourage participation by designing a public disclosure rule. A finite-vehicle coordination game links physical fuel savings to vehicles' joining decisions under two information environments: private joining costs and private observations of the common corridor state. Private costs yield a posterior-mean participation response, while private observations require richer posterior information and create correlated formation outcomes. We formulate persuasive disclosure problems and develop computational methods for both regimes. In a literature-anchored reference scenario, optimized two-message disclosure supports participation of 8.74% and 51.83%, respectively, compared with zero without disclosure and 5.15% and 39.27% under full disclosure. Gains concentrate in intermediate opportunities, depend on joining-cost calibration, and need not maximize welfare. Numerical sensitivity and trajectory checks quantify these effects. All gains are conditional on favorable symmetric equilibrium selection: public information alone cannot eliminate the no-participation equilibrium when joining requires a costly commitment without a guaranteed partner.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00584 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T18:11:22.750Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).