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Understanding In-Context Multimodal Jailbreaks via Posterior Reweighting — arXiv:2609.10613
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10613
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T05:46:20.246Z
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Understanding In-Context Multimodal Jailbreaks via Posterior Reweighting — arXiv:2609.10613 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10613 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c80cb2e6b58e (Metraipolis archive dc_c80cb2e6b58e, sha256 41d39106f4c095d03476e51882892059712e2cad72b30ef782f4ab9bc4e485a7)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc80cb2e6b58e,
title = {Understanding In-Context Multimodal Jailbreaks via Posterior Reweighting — arXiv:2609.10613},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10613},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c80cb2e6b58e; sha256 41d39106f4c095d03476e51882892059712e2cad72b30ef782f4ab9bc4e485a7},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10613. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
In-context learning (ICL) jailbreaks reveal a critical vulnerability in multimodal large language models (MLLMs): harmful demonstrations in the prompt can induce unsafe outputs without modifying model parameters. Despite extensive empirical evidence, existing work lacks a principled understanding of why such jailbreaks reliably succeed or how their effectiveness scales with context composition. We propose a posterior reweighting framework that models a safety-aligned MLLM as implicitly operating over competing behavioral modes, and interprets in-context demonstrations as inference-time evidence that dynamically shifts the model's posterior preference between safe and harmful behaviors. This view formalizes jailbreak as a process of evidence accumulation, yielding predictive scaling laws with respect to demonstration count, harmful ratio, adversarial strength, and semantic diversity. Guided by this framework, we introduce a posterior-aware inference-time defense that adaptively injects benign counter-evidence based on estimated risk, effectively suppressing harmful posterior drift while preserving model utility. Compared to existing in-context defenses, our method achieves a significantly improved robustness-utility trade-off under a fixed intervention budget. Together, our results establish posterior reweighting as a unifying and predictive framework for understanding and mitigating ICL jailbreak in MLLMs. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-11 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Machine Learning (cs.LG). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10613 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T05:30:39.369Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).