Metraipolis › archive › dc_c7fe79ec4fcb

Truthful by Omission: Click Thinning for LLM-Native Advertising — arXiv:2610.30999

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30999
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-25T08:34:46.940Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
e1a293b1bc9716d8063466a7c109d88826c01e70a914fad933da36af263edced
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c7fe79ec4fcb

How to cite

Truthful by Omission: Click Thinning for LLM-Native Advertising — arXiv:2610.30999 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30999 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c7fe79ec4fcb (Metraipolis archive dc_c7fe79ec4fcb, sha256 e1a293b1bc9716d8063466a7c109d88826c01e70a914fad933da36af263edced)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc7fe79ec4fcb,
  title = {Truthful by Omission: Click Thinning for LLM-Native Advertising — arXiv:2610.30999},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30999},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c7fe79ec4fcb; sha256 e1a293b1bc9716d8063466a7c109d88826c01e70a914fad933da36af263edced},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30999. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Generative AI assistants are becoming an advertising medium, embedding sponsored content in their answers. This setting departs from classical position auctions in two ways: an ad's click-through rate depends on the passage that hosts it, and because users stop at their first click, earlier ads take clicks from later ones. This competition for clicks makes truthfulness delicate: a higher bid can reshape the allocation and put a competitor ahead of the bidder, reducing the bidder's clicks. Existing mechanisms either attain a constant fraction of the optimal welfare (advertisers' total click value) but are not known to be truthful, or are truthful but their welfare guarantee degrades as the number of passages grows. We achieve both even when the answer and its editorial order are fixed before bidding. Assuming each ad's click-through rate when reached is known and unaffected by omitting other ads, we give a computationally efficient mechanism that is truthful in expectation and attains at least half the optimal welfare under free reordering. Our key idea, click thinning, omits ads at random, showing earlier ads less often so that each ad's overall click probability no longer depends on the order of the ads. Welfare maximization then reduces to a tractable matching problem, and solving it exactly with VCG-style payments makes truthful bidding optimal in expectation. Characterizing the click probabilities that omission can achieve sharpens the approximation factor from $2$ to $2-(1-\delta)^{K-1}$ when at most $K$ ads are shown and each click-through rate is at most $\delta$. This factor is the best possible for any order-preserving rule, even one that ignores incentives and computation, so truthfulness and computational efficiency incur no additional worst-case loss.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.AI, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Data Structures and Algorithms (cs.DS).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30999 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-25T08:31:13.213Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AI/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).