Metraipolis › archive › dc_c74a9f28eaeb

A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Real-Time Deviation Settlement in Local Energy Communities — arXiv:2611.03030

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03030
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T11:15:29.498Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
fff767153b00a2050a6c33f9b9d90fde176b2062189d7f786172f864c58d9d9f
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c74a9f28eaeb

How to cite

A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Real-Time Deviation Settlement in Local Energy Communities — arXiv:2611.03030 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03030 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c74a9f28eaeb (Metraipolis archive dc_c74a9f28eaeb, sha256 fff767153b00a2050a6c33f9b9d90fde176b2062189d7f786172f864c58d9d9f)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc74a9f28eaeb,
  title = {A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Real-Time Deviation Settlement in Local Energy Communities — arXiv:2611.03030},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03030},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c74a9f28eaeb; sha256 fff767153b00a2050a6c33f9b9d90fde176b2062189d7f786172f864c58d9d9f},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03030. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

This paper proposes a cooperative game-theoretical framework for the financial settlement of real-time deviations in Community-Based Local Energy Markets (CB-LEMs). The real-time settlement process is modeled as a transferable-utility cooperative game, and the resulting Real-Time Local Energy Market (RTLEM) game is shown to be superadditive and balanced. We analyze two game-theoretical allocation mechanisms, the Shapley value and the nucleolus, and evaluate their efficiency, individual rationality, coalitional rationality, and temporal-aggregation properties. We subsequently compare these mechanisms with a settlement rule based on proportional imbalance responsibility. The three mechanisms are efficient and individually rational, but only the nucleolus is guaranteed to satisfy coalitional rationality for every RTLEM instance. The proposed framework is demonstrated using real-world data from a residential energy community in Amsterdam, showing the trade-offs among the three allocation mechanisms in terms of surplus distribution, coalitional stability, interpretability, and computational requirements.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Systems and Control (eess.SY); Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03030 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T11:01:07.158Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).