Metraipolis › archive › dc_c59e6fb64c2d

Recognizing Dominance through Local Improvement — arXiv:2610.40243

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40243
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-01T02:59:21.510Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
d652a979ac2197fb2e9d0fcff94d6140a7d8c3baeaf8cd026be18da735409c81
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c59e6fb64c2d

How to cite

Recognizing Dominance through Local Improvement — arXiv:2610.40243 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40243 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c59e6fb64c2d (Metraipolis archive dc_c59e6fb64c2d, sha256 d652a979ac2197fb2e9d0fcff94d6140a7d8c3baeaf8cd026be18da735409c81)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc59e6fb64c2d,
  title = {Recognizing Dominance through Local Improvement — arXiv:2610.40243},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40243},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c59e6fb64c2d; sha256 d652a979ac2197fb2e9d0fcff94d6140a7d8c3baeaf8cd026be18da735409c81},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40243. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Strategy-proofness is the traditional standard for predictable behavior, yet participants often fail to play dominant strategies. Most existing simplicity concepts attribute these failures to the cost of contingent reasoning, which they lower by comparing the worst case of the dominant strategy with the best case of an alternative. I argue that there is another approach, one that makes more use of the structure of the strategy set, which I formalize as a neighbor relation. Comparing neighboring strategies can reduce the need for contingent reasoning, and, even with a single contingency, it can simplify the search through the strategy set. I introduce a new simplicity criterion: a mechanism is local improvement solvable under a neighbor relation if repeatedly moving to an improving neighbor always reaches a dominant strategy. Strategy-proofness is the criterion under the coarsest relation, and many classical mechanisms satisfy it under finer ones. In extensive-form mechanisms without duplicate dominant strategies, the criterion under one-situation neighbors is strict action-proofness, which is distinct from obvious strategy-proofness. Among local improvement solvable mechanisms that implement the same outcomes, the criterion predicts more dominant-strategy play where the local comparison is salient.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40243 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-01T02:25:15.914Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).