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Can statistical models capture Mamdani's success? Social choice, ranked-choice voting, and model fit, with an application to the 2025 New York City Democratic Primary — arXiv:2608.23800

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23800
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T06:42:26.269Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
f2c728e440c8d406e7aeed42341523ac7b315fac90232b95e7e67e367854bca4
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c515cd2a1158

How to cite

Can statistical models capture Mamdani's success? Social choice, ranked-choice voting, and model fit, with an application to the 2025 New York City Democratic Primary — arXiv:2608.23800 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23800 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c515cd2a1158 (Metraipolis archive dc_c515cd2a1158, sha256 f2c728e440c8d406e7aeed42341523ac7b315fac90232b95e7e67e367854bca4)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc515cd2a1158,
  title = {Can statistical models capture Mamdani's success? Social choice, ranked-choice voting, and model fit, with an application to the 2025 New York City Democratic Primary — arXiv:2608.23800},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23800},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c515cd2a1158; sha256 f2c728e440c8d406e7aeed42341523ac7b315fac90232b95e7e67e367854bca4},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23800. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Ranked-choice voting is increasingly prevalent in elections. An extensive literature in social choice theory -- the study of collective decision-making with the goal of making compromises among disparate opinions -- considers theoretical and empirical properties of various election procedures. Recently, a sub-literature on rationalizability, led by social choice theorists and computer scientists, makes explicit connections between social choice rules and maximum likelihood estimation. This paper further illuminates connections between social choice and statistical summaries of data. We begin by studying rationalizability from a statistical perspective, expanding existing results to realistic voting contexts and deriving statistical details necessary for model estimation and assessment. We then apply our work to ranked-choice votes from the 2025 New York City Democratic mayoral primary election. We demonstrate how rationalizing models impose unrealistic distributional assumptions and thus exhibit poor fit to voting data. Additionally, we show that non-rationalizing models meaningfully elucidate heterogeneous voter preferences. Our work demonstrates the inability of rationalizing models to capture key features of distributions of preferences in political elections, depriving analysts of fundamental uses, such as inference, typically associated with statistical modeling. Conversely, we show that statistical modeling can capture nuanced voter preferences by paying careful attention to plausible data-generating mechanisms.

Tema degli esploratori: statistica e scienza dei dati (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-26 in stat.AP).
Categorie arXiv: Applications (stat.AP).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23800 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T06:38:22.555Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/stat.AP/2026-08-26?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).